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Note
To Compel or Encourage: Seeking Compliance with
International Trade Agreements at the State Level
Kenneth J. Cooper
INTRODUCTION
The relationship between U.S. international trade obliga-
tions and the policies of state governments has become an in-
creasingly visible issue in international trade. It is well settled
that the federal government can legally preempt state laws that
are inconsistent with international trade agreements.' Federal
officials, however, are often reluctant to use this power. While
actual conflicts between state laws and trade agreements have
been rare, recent developments have focused attention on the
issue of state compliance.
This Note examines the issue of state compliance in two ar-
eas. It considers state compliance with respect to the general
obligations to eliminate non-tariff barriers to trade,2 common to
most international trade agreements such as the General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade (GATT),3 and the recently completed
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).4 It then
considers state compliance with respect to trade agreements that
deal specifically with government procurement.
Part I describes the federal government's legal power to
bind the states under international trade agreements, and the
1. See infra notes 14, 20-21 and accompanying text.
2. The term "non-tariff barriers" refers to practices such as internal taxa-
tion and regulations that are applied to foreign products in a discriminatory
manner. Such barriers conflict with the national treatment obligations of
GATT Article III. See infra note 25.
3. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30,
1947, 61 Stat. pts 5, 6, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter GATT].
4. The North American Free Trade Agreement, the parties to which are
the United States, Mexico, and Canada, was completed on September 6, 1992
and was signed on December 17, 1992 by then U.S. President Bush, Canadian
Prime Minister Mulroney, and Mexican President Salinas. The Agreement has
not yet been adopted. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992,
U.S.-Mexico-Canada, (draft of Sept. 6, 1992) [hereinafter NAFTA].
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political sensitivities that can hinder the use of this power. Part
II explores federal obligations to ensure that states comply with
GATT's national treatment requirements.5 Recent GATT panel
findings confirm this obligation under Article XXIV:12.6 Part II
then details developing proposals in the Uruguay Round 7 and in
NAFTA which address state compliance. Finally, this section
argues that state compliance is essential to the success of trade
agreements aimed at reducing or eliminating non-tariff barriers
to imported goods.
Part III explores the issue of state compliance under cur-
rent and projected international agreements on government pro-
curement. While states are currently free to discriminate in
their procurement practices, as confirmed by several court deci-
sions, subnational procurement has been a central topic of ongo-
ing GATT negotiations. Under a U.S. proposal, states would
voluntarily accede to a revised GATT Procurement Code.8
NAFTA's chapter on government procurement 9 adopts this ap-
proach. This section argues that voluntary coverage will not
produce meaningful results, and that liberalization of subna-
tional procurement can be achieved only through mandatory
coverage of the states under international procurement
agreements.
I. THE LEGAL AND POLITICAL FRAMEWORK OF
STATE COMPLIANCE
The problem of state compliance is rooted in the tensions of
U.S. federalism. The U.S. Constitution delegates broad enumer-
ated powers to the national government, 10 but also reserves pow-
ers to the states." Among the powers granted to Congress is the
power to "regulate Commerce with foreign Nations and among
5. See infra notes 23-25 and accompanying text.
6. See intfra text accompanying note 37.
7. The Uruguay Round is the current round of multilateral trade negotia-
tions under GATT, named for the country where it was launched in September
1986. The talks had been stalled over the issue of agricultural subsidies. Talks
were expected to move forward following an agreement between the United
States and the European Community on farm subsidies reached on November
20, 1992. See, e.g., Keith Bradsher, Europeans Agree with U.S. on Cutting Farm
Subsidies; French Withhold Support, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 1992, at Al.
8. See infra part III.C.
9. See infra part III.C.
10. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
11. The Tenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution states that "[t]he pow-
ers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it
to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people."
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the several States,"'1 2 commonly known as the Commerce
Clause. The authority to regulate foreign commerce is particu-
larly broad and is vested exclusively in the national government.
As the U.S. Supreme Court has noted, in matters of interna-
tional trade, the United States "speak[s] with one voice.' u3
Any federal law enacted pursuant to an enumerated power,
such as the Commerce Clause, is superior to state law under the
Constitution's Supremacy Clause.14 Thus, when an interna-
tional trade agreement becomes part of U.S. federal law, it is
superior to state law.
International agreements may enter U.S. law in one of two
ways.' 5 First, an agreement may be self-executing, in which case
it enters U.S. law directly.16 Second, an agreement may be non-
self-executing, in which case it enters U.S. law through a sepa-
rate act embodying the substance of the agreement. 17 The act
will usually take the form of congressional implementing legis-
12. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
13. Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 449 (1979).
The exclusive congressional power over foreign commerce may be so broad as
to invalidate state laws which impact foreign commerce even in the absence of
conflicting federal legislation. See id. In Japan Line, the Supreme Court held
that a California tax levied on the containers of a Japanese shipping company
whose vessels passed through the state was an invalid state intrusion on the
exclusive power of the federal government to regulate foreign commerce. Id.
The decision was based upon congressional power over international trade
granted in the Commerce Clause. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. No specific
agreement or federal statute preempted the tax. 441 U.S. 434.
14. The Supremacy Clause states that "[t]his Constitution and the Laws of
the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties
made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall
be the supreme Law of the Land ...... U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2. The term
"Treaties" has been interpreted broadly to include not only treaties ratified by
two-thirds of the Senate under Article II, U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2, but most
foreign executive agreements. See, e.g., United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324
(1937). See also John H. Jackson, The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
in United States Domestic Law, 66 MICH. L. REV. 250, 253 (1967).
15. See Robert E. Hudec, The Legal Status of GATT in the Domestic Law of
the United States, in THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND GATT 187, 188-91 (Mein-
hard Hill et al. eds., 1986).
16. The significance of a self-executing agreement is that it has "direct ap-
plicability" in U.S. domestic law and courts must accept the provisions of the
agreement itself as applicable law in appropriate situations. See JOHN H. JACK-
SON & WILLIAM J. DAVEY, LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RE-
LATIONS: CASES, MATERIALS AND TEXT 122-25 (2d ed. 1986).
17. Hudec, supra note 15, at 188. A corollary of this principle is that a non-
self-executing agreement becomes part of U.S. law only to the extent that it is
incorporated into the legislation or proclamation by which it is implemented.
Id.
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lation'8 or an executive proclamation pursuant to prior congres-
sional authorization. 19
Any international agreement that becomes part of federal
law through appropriate lawmaking procedures is always supe-
rior to state law.20 As a result, state laws that conflict with a
validly enacted agreement are preempted.2 1 A conflict will, of
18. Such legislation would incorporate the requirements of the negotiated
agreement into U.S. law. An example is the Trade Agreements Act of 1979,
which implemented the various agreements reached in the Tokyo Round of
GATT negotiations. 19 U.S.C. §§ 2502-2582 (1979). Implementing legislation
does not always mirror the language of the agreement itself. See infra note 45.
19. An executive proclamation would be issued following the completion of
an agreement negotiated by the President under authority granted by separate
congressional legislation. GATT came into U.S. law through executive procla-
mation. See infra text accompanying notes 31-35. The President may also have
the power to enter into international trade agreements without congressional
authorization or approval on the basis of his own inherent foreign affairs power.
Hudec, supra note 15, at 194. The constitutionality of such action is not clear.
Because Congress is given authority to regulate foreign commerce, U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 8, cl. 3, an agreement entered into by the President without congres-
sional authorization may be held to be a violation of the constitutional separa-
tion of powers. See, e.g., United States v. Guy W. Capps, Inc., 204 F.2d 655 (4th
Cir. 1953), aff'd on other grounds, 348 U.S. 296 (1955). In Youngstown Sheet &
Tube Co. v. Sawyer, Justice Jackson, in a concurring opinion, discussed three
varying levels of authority under which the President can act. 343 U.S. 579
(1952) (Jackson, J. concurring). Jackson noted that the President's authority is
at its maximum when he acts pursuant to the express or implied authority of
Congress, and is at its lowest ebb when he takes measures that are contrary to
the express or implied will of Congress. Id. at 635-37. However, Jackson noted
that there is a "zone of twilight" in which the distribution of powers may be
unclear. Id. at 637. In this situation, congressional inertia or indifference may
enable the President to act independently. Id.
20. See supra note 14 and accompanying text. Any domestic federal law
passed by Congress and signed by the Executive is superior to state law by vir-
tue of the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
Validly enacted legislation which implements a trade agreement has the same
status as other domestic legislation. Hudec, supra note 15, at 190-91. A presi-
dential proclamation pursuant to valid congressional authorization also has this
status. Id. A self-executing agreement which attains the status of U.S. federal
law directly is, by virtue of the Supremacy Clause, also superior to state law.
All international agreements which have entered U.S. federal law can be over-
ridden by subsequent federal legislation. Hudec, supra note 15, at 191-92.
21. In general, by virtue of the Supremacy Clause, U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2,
a federal law enacted by Congress pursuant to an enumerated power preempts
state law where there is a direct conflict between the two laws. In addition, a
state law not in direct conflict with a federal law may be preempted if it affects
an area in which Congress has legislated so thoroughly as to "occupy the field."
Hines v Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941); See also 1 RONALD D. ROTUNDA ET AL.,
TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAw: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE §§ 12.1-12.2
(1986) [hereinafter ROTUNDA].
In order to preempt inconsistent state law, an international trade agree-
ment must actually be applicable at the state level. The 1979 GATT Procure-
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course, exist only if the agreement requires compliance at the
state level. Because the Constitution prohibits the states from
laying duties on imports and exports,2 2 there is never a conflict
between state laws and provisions of trade agreements that reg-
ulate tariffs. Certain state laws and regulations may, however,
be preempted by trade agreements that require national treat-
ment of foreign products.
National treatment obligations require that once imported
products enter a country, they must be treated no worse than
any like domestic product for purposes of internal sale.23 The
goal of national treatment is to prevent the discriminatory appli-
cation of internal taxes and regulations to foreign products.24
GATT Article III aims specifically at eliminating such non-tariff
barriers to trade.25
The preemption of state laws that conflict with national
treatment provisions such as GATT Article III may be perceived
as an infringement upon the ability of state lawmakers to set
local policy. It is not politically desirable for federal officials to
appear to be interfering in policies traditionally set at the state
level. Consequently, federal officials often seek to play down
the preemptive effects of an international trade agreement. 26 To
date, such reticence has not caused serious problems because ac-
ment Code, for example, does not apply to state procurement. See irkfra text
accompanying note 111.
22. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10.
23. See John H. Jackson, National Treatment Obligations and Non-Tariff
Barriers, 10 MICH. J. INT'L L. 207, 208-09 (1989) [hereinafter Nat'l Treatment
Obligations].
24. Id. at 209.
25. In relevant part, GATT Article III states that:
1. The contracting parties recognize that internal taxes and other
internal charges, and laws, regulations and requirements affecting the
internal sale... should not be applied to imported or domestic prod-
ucts so as to afford protection to domestic production.
2. The products of the territory of any contracting party im-
ported into the territory of any other contracting party shall not be
subject, directly or indirectly, to internal taxes or other internal
charges of any kind in excess of those applied, directly or indirectly, to
like domestic products.
4. The products of the territory of any contracting party ... shall
be accorded treatment no less favourable than that accorded to like
products of national origin in respect of all laws, regulations and re-
quirements affecting their internal sale ....
26. In GATT, for example, federal officials have sometimes maintained
that the Agreement requires only that the federal government encourage states
to comply. See infra text accompanying note 45.
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tual violations of GATT at the state level have been rare.27
Recent legal and political developments have heightened
the sensitivity of state officials to the potential preemption of
their policies. In 1992, a GATT panel ruled that various state
regulations favoring local beer producers are in violation of
GATT.28 Further, environmental and agricultural interest
groups that are opposed to NAFTA and the Uruguay Round
have been warning state governments that their policy making
ability will be curtailed by the new agreements. 29 These devel-
opments have reportedly caused some state governments to edge
closer to groups opposed to NAFTA and GATT.3° Thus, state
compliance has become a conspicuous issue in international
trade.
II. NON-TARIFF BARRIERS TO TRADE IN GOODS
A. GATT's NATIONAL TREATMENT OBLIGATIONS AND THE
STATES: ARTICLE XXIV:12
GATT was proclaimed into U.S. law by President Truman
on December 30, 1947,31 pursuant to section 350 of the Recipro-
27. A 1992 GATT panel ruling marked the first time a GATT panel has
ruled that U.S. state measures violate the agreement. See in~fra text accompa-
nying notes 62-77. A few state court decisions have invalidated state laws held
to be in violation of GATT. See, e.g., Hawaii v. Ho, 41 Haw. 565 (1957) and Bald-
win-Lima-Hamilton Corp. v. Superior Court, 25 Cal. Rptr. 798 (Cal. Dist. Ct.
App. 1962).
28. The panel ruling is discussed in detail, infr notes 62-77 and accompa-
nying text.
29. In July 1992, a representative of the Institute for Agriculture and Trade
Policy told the National Conference of State Legislatures that GATT (espe-
cially if the Uruguay Round is successfully completed) and NAFTA will affect a
state's ability to legislate in the areas of taxes, economic development, health
and safety, and environmental policy. GATT Threatens to Preempt States'
Rights to Make Policy, Annual Meeting of NCSL Told, 9 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA)
1344 (Aug. 5, 1992).
30. See Bob Davis, Fighting 'Nafta': Free Trade Pact Spurs a Diverse Coali-
tion of Grass Roots Foes, WALL ST. J., Dec. 23, 1992, at Al, A6. For example, an
adviser to the state of Maine has expressed concern that NAFTA will affect
Maine's regulation of organically grown produce. Id.
State concerns will likely increase if GATT is extended to service indus-
tries as currently proposed in the Uruguay Round negotiations. Coverage of
service industries could require policy changes in areas such as banking, insur-
ance, and legal services which have been traditionally regulated at the state
level. See generally Tommy G. Thompson, A Governor's Perspective on the
Trade, BusINESS AMERICA, May 6, 1991, at 13, available in LEXIS, Nexis li-
brary, Mags file.
31. Proclamation 2761A, 3 C.F.R. 139 (1987).
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cal Trade Agreements Act of 1934.32 Section 350 authorized the
President to "enter into foreign trade agreements, '33 and to
"proclaim such modifications of existing duties and other import
restrictions," necessary to carry out the agreements.34 Although
there is some dispute over whether the language of section 350
authorized the President to proclaim all of GATT's commercial
policy rules, it is generally accepted that GATT entered U.S. fed-
eral law as a valid executive agreement.35
Because GATT .is part of federal law, it is superior to state
law. Thus, if GATT was intended to cover the conduct of subna-
tional units of government, inconsistent state laws would have
been legally preempted immediately upon the President's 1947
proclamation,3 and they would continue to be preempted unless
GATT is superseded by subsequent federal law. If GATT does
not require compliance at the state level, however, then no state
laws will be in conflict with the agreement.
The language of GATT Article XXIV:12 raises questions
about whether the U.S. federal government is obligated to bring
state level practices into compliance with GATT. Article
XXIV:12 states that "[e]ach contracting party shall take such
32. Reciprocal Trade Agreement Act of 1934, ch. 474, 48 Stat. 943 (1934)
(codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 1351 (1988)). The authority was reenacted
in 1945. Ch. 269, 59 Stat. 410 (1945).
33. 19 U.S.C. § 1351(a)(1)(A) (1988).
34. Id. § 1351(a)(1)(B) (1988).
35. See Hudec, supra note 15, at 199. Professor Hudec notes that the valid-
ity of the agreement rests either on the authorization of section 350 or the Pres-
ident's inherent foreign affairs power. IM at 208-09. Hudec argues that
Congress may authorize an executive agreement without giving the President
the authority to change federal law in every area covered by the agreement. I&
Section 350 required the President to obtain authorization before proclaiming
new tariff rates because such action involved changing prior federal law. Id.
No special authority was needed to proclaim GATT's commercial policy rules,
however, because no existing federal laws were in conflict with these rules. Id,
The end result is that GATT's commercial policy rules are inferior to federal
law and superior to state law. Since no existing federal laws conflicted with the
GATT commercial policies, the practical effect of this inferior position is mini-
mal. Id
Professor Jackson asserts that GATT is a valid executive agreement be-
cause Congress knew that a trade agreement would involve extensive non-tariff
provisions when it authorized the President to negotiate such an agreement
under section 350. Jackson, supra note 14, at 262. Jackson notes further that
Congress' subsequent acceptance of GATT as an integral part of U.S. trade con-
firms the validity of the proclamation which placed GATT into U.S. federal law.
Id at 268.
36. Assuming that GATT requires subnational compliance, the 1947 procla-
mation resulted in total and immediate preemption of state laws inconsistent
with GA'TT. See Hudec, supra note 15, at 219.
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reasonable measures as may be available to it to ensure obser-
vance of the provisions of this Agreement by the regional and
local governments and authorities within its territory. ' 37 The
provision imposes a qualified obligation on central governments
to ensure that the GATT provisions are observed below the na-
tional level. In carrying out this obligation, a national govern-
ment is required to take measures which are both "available"
and "reasonable" to bring about state compliance.
Whether the qualification of Article XXIV:12 applies to the
United States depends upon whether the U.S. federal govern-
ment has means "available" to compel state compliance, and
whether the use of such means is "reasonable." Because GATT
is part of federal law, which is superior to state law, it is clear
that the legal means to ensure state compliance are "available"
to the federal government. Indeed, by making GATT part of
federal law, the federal government has already preempted any
conflicting state laws.
Article XXIV:12 requires only that "reasonable measures"
be taken to ensure state compliance. The drafting history of
GATT indicates that compelling subnational compliance is "rea-
sonable" under Article XXIV:12, unless such action would cause
a sudden disruption of government. 38 For example, the immedi-
ate elimination of a discriminatory tax that is a major source of a
state's revenue would not be "reasonable." 39 U.S. states are con-
stitutionally prohibited from imposing duties on imported
goods. 4° Furthermore, the power to regulate foreign commerce
is vested in the Congress.41 It is unlikely, therefore, that any
state has been so dependent upon the discriminatory treatment
of foreign goods, such that the elimination of these practices
would cause serious hardship.42 Thus, it is "reasonable" for the
U.S. federal government to use its legally "available" power to
preempt state laws that conflict with GATT.43
Several U.S. state courts, though not directly implicating
37. GATT, art. XXIV:12 (emphasis added).
38. See Jackson, supra note 14, at 304-08.
39. Id. Even this situation would probably not be an absolute exemption to
changing a discriminatory state tax. An interpretative note to GATf Article III
states that the term "reasonable measures" in Article XXIV:12 would permit
the elimination of "inconsistent taxation gradually... if abrupt action would
create serious administrative and financial difficulties." GATT, ad art. III. Cf
infra note 76.
40. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 2.
41. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
42. Hudec, supra note 15, at 220.
43. Id.
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Article XXIV:12, have held that GATT, as part of federal law,
prevails over conflicting state law.44 Federal officials, however,
have not always acknowledged GATT's preemption of state law.
A state department official testifying before the Senate Finance
Committee in 1949 took the position that Article XXIV:12 only
obligates the federal government to persuade states to volunta-
rily comply with GATT.45 This position contradicted the draft-
ing history of Article XXIV:12.46 More recently, the U.S.
government has taken inconsistent litigation positions in two
GATT disputes involving Article XXIV:12.
In Canada: Import, Distribution and Sale of Certain Alco-
holic Drinks by Provincial Marketing Agencies,47 the United
States asserted that certain practices of Canadian provincial li-
quor boards, which control the conditions for sale and distribu-
tion of beer in each province, discriminated against imports in
violation of GATT Article III.48 The complaint focused on two
44. In Hawaii v. Ho, the Hawaii Supreme Court held that a territorial law
which required all sellers of foreign eggs to post a sign reading "WE SELL
FOREIGN EGGS" was in conflict with GATT's national treatment obligations.
41 Haw. 565, 571 (1957). The court held that GATT was a valid executive agree-
ment, and thus, under the Supremacy Clause, U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2, preempts
inconsistent state law. 41 Haw. at 568. In K.S.B. Technical Sales Corp. v. North
Jersey Dist. Water Supply Commission, the New Jersey Supreme Court recog-
nized GATT as a valid agreement and thus superior to conflicting state law. 381
A.2d 774, 778 (N.J. 1977). The state measure at issue, however, was related to
government procurement which the court held was not subject to GATT's na-
tional treatment requirements. Id. at 778.
45. See Jackson, supra note 14, at 303-04. Thirty years later, Congress took
a similar position in implementing the 1979 GATT Standards Code. Agreement
on Technical Barriers to Trade, BISD 26th Supp. 8 (Apr. 12, 1979). The Stan-
dards Code covers measures aimed at protecting areas such as health, safety,
and the environment. The Standards Code itself contains a provision that mir-
rors the language of GATT Article XXIV:12. Id. at 12. The implementing legis-
lation, however, speaks only of a "sense of Congress" that states should not
maintain discriminatory product standards, and provides that the President
shall take reasonable measures to 'promote" state compliance. 19 U.S.C. § 2533
(1980) (emphasis added). The use of the aspirational term "promote," rather
than the mandatory term "ensure" means that the Standards Code provisions
do not apply directly to state measures. See Hudec, supra note 15, at 233. Be-
cause the Standards Code has force in U.S. domestic law only through the im-
plementing legislation, inconsistent state law is not preempted. Id. at 220.
46. The drafting history of Article XXIV:12 indicates that the provision
was meant to apply only to central governments which do not have the author-
ity to control subsidiary units of government. See Jackson, supra note 14, at
308-10.
47. Canada-Impor4 Distribution and Sale of Certain Alcoholic Drinks by
Provincial Marketing Agencies, GATT Doc. DS/17/R (Oct. 16, 1991), 5.36-
5.37 [hereinafter Panel Report on Canadian Alcohol Restrictions].
48. Id. 4.26-4.78.
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major practices of the liquor boards. First, the United States
complained that the boards applied higher price mark-ups to im-
ported beer than they applied to locally brewed beer.49 Second,
the United States complained that in several provinces, domestic
brewers were allowed to operate private delivery systems and to
sell directly to points of sale, while only provincial boards could
distribute imports.50 The GATT panel found that these prac-
tices violated GATT.51
On the Article XXIV:12 issue, the United States argued that
"reasonable measures" were available to Canada to ensure pro-
vincial compliance because the Canadian Parliament had the
legal power to impose discipline on the provincial liquor
boards.52 Canada argued that the determination of what is "rea-
sonable and available" must not rest solely on legal terms, but
must also incorporate "domestic politics and policies. '53 Canada
argued further that the contracting party itself must be the
judge of what is "reasonable" and "available." 54
The panel rejected Canada's arguments and held that
GATT, not the contracting party, is the judge of whether all
"reasonable measures" have been taken.55 The panel noted that
the provisions of GATT are applicable to measures at the re-
gional and local level,56 and that Article XXIV:12 merely quali-
fies the obligation to implement GATT requirements with
respect to such measures. 57 The panel further noted that when
subnational practices violate GATT, the contracting party must
demonstrate that it has taken all "reasonable measures as may
be available to it" to bring such practices into compliance.5 0
The panel found that Canada had not taken reasonable
measures to ensure compliance by the provinces following a 1988
GATT panel ruling that similar practices of the provincial liquor
49. I& i 4.26-4.38.
50. Id. 7 4.8-4.13.
51. Id. 1 6.1.
52. Id. 4.81. The United States pointed out that the Canadian Parliament
had demonstrated power over provincial liquor boards in the legislation that
implemented the U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement. Id. The panel did not
comment on whether this legal measure proposed by the United States was rea-
sonable or available to Canada.
53. Id. 1 4.82.
54. Id. 5.35.
55. Id. 5.36.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
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boards violated GATr.59 The panel did not specifically define
what constitutes a reasonable measure and did not comment on
whether the legal measure suggested by the United States was
reasonable or available.6° The panel did state that Canada
would have to demonstrate a "serious, persistent, and convincing
effort" to secure compliance by the provinces.6'
In a reversal of roles several months after the dispute dis-
cussed above, Canada requested a GATT panel to resolve a dis-
pute over U.S. treatment of imported beer.62 The dispute
centered on excise taxes levied on beer and wine at both the fed-
eral and state levels. The federal government maintained a
lower tax rate for beer brewed domestically by relatively small
brewers.63 Eighteen states maintained similar policies whereby
in-state brewers were either taxed at a lower rate or received
59. Id. 1 5.37-5.38. The 1988 complaint was brought by the European Com-
munity. See Canada-Import Distribution and Sale of Alcoholic Drinks by Ca-
nadian Provincial Marketing Agencies, BISD 35th Supp. 37 (1988) (GATT
panel report adopted Mar. 22, 1988). The EC complaint focused on substantially
similar provincial measures as did the 1991 U.S. complaint. In the EC dispute,
Canada claimed that the contracting party itself should be the one to determine
what is a reasonable measure under Article XXIV:12. Id. at 39. The panel
ruled that Canada would have to demonstrate to the GATT parties that it had
taken all reasonable, available measures. Id. at 91-92. GAT would then have
to determine whether Canada had met its obligation under Article XXIV:12.
Id.
In the 1991 complaint, the United States charged that the discriminatory
measures were still in place. Panel Report on Canadian Alcohol Restrictions,
supra note 47, 1 4.79. Canada claimed that it had taken all reasonable measures
through a settlement agreement with the European Community following the
1988 dispute, and an interprovincial agreement in which both the national gov-
ernment and many, but not all, of the provinces had agreed to work towards the
elimination of discriminatory practices with regard to alcoholic beverage im-
ports. Id. 4.80. The panel concluded that neither the settlement nor the inter-
provincial agreement specifically addressed the practices at issue. Id. 5.37. It
concluded, therefore, that Canada had not taken reasonable measures to ensure
provincial compliance in accordance with its obligations under Article XXIV:12.
Id. 11 5.37-5.38.
60. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
61. Panel Report on Canadian Alcohol Restrictions, supra note 47, 5.37.
GATT has previously found that due to the Canadian constitutional structure,
in at least some instances, the national government does not have "available to
it" reasonable measures to ensure provincial compliance. See itfra note 76.
Here the panel seems to be saying that even if there are no ultimate measures
to which Canada can resort to, it must first demonstrate that it has made a
rigorous effort to achieve provincial compliance before GATT will recognize a
limitation on its duty under Article XXIV:12.
62. United States: Measures Affecting Alcoholic and Malt Beverages,
GATT Doc. DS/23/R (GAIT panel report) (Mar. 16, 1992) [hereinafter Panel
Report on U.S. Alcohol Restrictions].
63. Id. 1 2.7. The first 60,000 barrels produced by U.S. breweries with an-
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tax credits.64 In United States: Measures Affecting Alcoholic
and Malt Beverages,65 the GATT panel found that these tax poli-
cies violated the national treatment requirements of Article
III:2.66 Other state practices, which included higher licensing
fees imposed on importers by some states,6 7 and the requirement
in several states that importers sell through wholesalers while
in-state brewers were permitted to sell directly to retailers,68
were also found to be in violation of GATT.
In contrast to its posture as the complainant in the earlier
dispute with Canada, the United States, now the defending
party, argued that any country with a federal system can invoke
Article XXIV:12 as a limitation on its duty to bring subnational
laws into compliance with GATT.69 Although in the earlier dis-
pute the U.S. government focused on the legal means available
to the Canadian government with respect to the provinces,70 its
arguments in the second case ignored the U.S. federal govern-
ment's constitutional ability to preempt state laws.7' Essen-
tially, the United States claimed that the identification of
reasonable measures, which might be available to ensure state
compliance, would depend upon the specific panel finding and
upon the particular state practice that was involved. 72 Further,
the United States noted that it would need more time to imple-
ment the panel's findings than would a contracting party that
did not have a federal system of government.73 Canada argued
that Article XXIV:12 obligated the U.S. federal government to
nual production of less than 2 million barrels are taxed at a rate of $7 per barrel
while all other beer is taxed at $18 per barrel. Id.
64. Id. 1 2.10-2.18. Georgia applies a lower rate to all in-state production.
Id. at table 1. Most of the other states apply the lower rate only to specified
levels of annual production. Id. Pennsylvania applies a lower rate to all U.S.
brewers with annual production of less than 300,000 barrels. Id.
65. Panel Report on U.S. Alcohol Restrictions, supra note 62.
66. Id. 6.1. For text of GATT Article 111:2, see supra note 25.
67. Id. TT 2.23-2.26.
68. Id. 6.1(j).
69. Id. T 3.132.
70. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
71. Canada also ignored its own arguments in the earlier dispute. In that
case, Canada argued that the contracting party itself should be the one to deter-
mine what is "reasonable" and "available" and that domestic political sensitivi-
ties should be part of such a determination. See supra text accompanying notes
53-54. In the second dispute, Canada argued that, given the constitutional struc-
ture of the United States, GATT Article XXIV:12 obligates the U.S. govern-
ment to compel state adherence to GATT. Panel Report on U.S. Alcohol
Restrictions, supra note 62, 3.133.
72. Panel Report on US. Alcohol Restrictions, supra note 62, 3.132.
73. I&
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compel state adherence to GATT.74
The GATT panel rejected the U.S. argument, stating that
the United States offered no evidence that "reasonable measures
[were not] available" to ensure state compliance with the rele-
vant GATT provisions.75 The panel found that Article XXIV:12
applies as a limitation on state compliance only where there are
"measures by regional or local authorities which the central gov-
ernment cannot control under the constitutional distribution of
powers. '76 The panel reasoned that because GATT is part of
U.S. federal law, which is superior to state law, there is no con-
stitutional impediment to bringing a state into compliance.
77
74. Id. 3.133.
75. Id. 5.78.
76. Id. 5.79. The narrow limitation on the duty of national governments
to bring their regional governments into compliance was found to be applicable
in Canada: Discriminatory Application of Retail Sales Tax on Gold Coins,
summarized in ROBERT E. HUDEC, ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW:
GATT DISPUTE SEr'LEMENT IN THE 1980s app. (Case no. 132) (forthcoming;
Butterworths U.S.A. 1993) (on file with the Minnesota Journal of Global
Trade). In 1983, South Africa complained that a provincial tax on the sale of
gold coins in Ontario, which exempted coins made in Canada, violated the na-
tional treatment obligations of GATT Article III. The panel did find the policy
to be inconsistent with Article III. Because under the Canadian Constitution,
however, power over taxation within a province is controlled exclusively by the
individual province, the panel could not definitively say that Canada had meas-
ures "available to it" to ensure provincial compliance. Id. The only legal means
of seeking provincial compliance would have been for the Canadian govern-
ment to invoke its seldom used power to refer constitutional issues to the Cana-
dian Supreme Court. Id. The panel could not clearly determine whether such a
measure was "reasonable." Id.
Significantly, the panel found that even where the duty to ensure subna-
tional compliance is limited under Article XXIV:12, the contracting party is still
responsible for GATT-inconsistent measures below the national level. Id. Such
measures would constitute a prima facie case of nullification and impairment
under GATT Article XXIII:I(b), and the contracting party may have to com-
pensate other parties whose benefits under GATT are impaired by the meas-
ures. Id.
The position on nullification and impairment has essentially been agreed
upon in the Uruguay Round negotiations. See infra notes 84-88 and accompa-
nying text.
77. Panel Report on U.S. Alcohol Restrictions, supra note 62, 5.80. The
panel also examined whether the Twenty-First Amendment to the U.S. Consti-
tution limits the federal government's power to preempt state liquor laws. Id.
5.46. In relevant part, the Twenty-First Amendment states that "[t]he transpor-
tation or importation into any State, Territory, or possession of the United
States for delivery or use therein of intoxicating liquors, in violation of the laws
thereof, is hereby prohibited." U.S. CONST. amend. XXI, § 2. The panel, citing
several U.S. Supreme Court decisions, concluded that the Twenty-First Amend-
ment grants broad regulatory powers to the states in the sale and distribution of
alcoholic beverages but does not grant the states power to protect in-state pro-
ducers of alcoholic beverages from outside competition. Panel Report on US.
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Neither GATT panel discussed what constitutes a reason-
able measure 78 under Article XXIV:12, other than the first
panel's reference to a "serious, persistent, and convincing ef-
fort. ' 7 9 It is clear, however, that where the federal government
has the legal authority to compel state compliance, GATT ex-
pects the federal government to force the states to change their
GATT-inconsistent policies. Domestic political sensitivities are
not part of the analysis.
The panel report's conclusion in United States: Measures
Affecting Alcoholic and Malt Beverages is consistent with the
U.S. constitutional structure and the drafting history of GATT
Article XXIV:12.80 The limitations of Article XXIV:12 were
meant to apply only where there is either no legal power over
subnational units of government, or where eliminating a state
measure is disruptive to government.8' Arguments that either
qualification applies to the United States cannot withstand scru-
tiny.8 2 When GATT entered U.S. federal law through the execu-
tive proclamation, it preempted all inconsistent state law. As
noted, several state court decisions confirm this conclusion.83
Thus, GATT obligates the U.S. federal government to compel
state compliance.
B. STATE OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE URUGUAY ROUND AND
NAFTA
The recent GATT disputes demonstrate the growing inter-
national attention being paid to subnational barriers to trade.
New language regarding subnational compliance has been pro-
posed in the Uruguay Round talks. Additionally, the recently
completed North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)
contains explicit language regarding state obligations.
Under the Uruguay Round proposals, the core Article
XXIV:12 language of "reasonable measures as may be available
to it" will remain. Proposed revisions would add that "[e]ach
Alcohol Restrictions, supra note 62, 5.46-5.47. Cases cited by the panel in-
cluded Hostetler v. Idlewild, 377 U.S. 324 (1964), and Bachus Imports v. Dias,
Director of Taxation of Hawaii, 486 U.S. 263 (1984).
78. The drafting history of Article XXIV:12 indicates that a measure is not
reasonable if it causes a sudden disruption of government. See supra text ac-
companying notes 38-39.
79. Panel Report on Canadian Alcohol Restrictions, supra note 47, 5.37.
80. See supra note 46.
81. See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text.
82. See supra text accompanying notes 40-43.
83. See supra note 44.
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contracting party is fully responsible... for the observance of all
provisions of the General Agreement,"' 4 and that "[t]he dispute
settlement provisions of the General Agreement may be invoked
in respect of measures affecting its observance taken by regional
or local governments."8 5 Furthermore, the revisions state that
"[t]he provisions relating to compensation and suspension of
concessions or other obligations apply in cases where it has not
been possible to secure such observance. '8 6
The new language neither clarifies the extent of the na-
tional government's obligation under Article XXIV:12 nor speci-
fies what constitutes "reasonable measures." By making each
contracting party responsible for subnational violations, how-
ever, the language does make it clear that Article XXIV:12 can-
not be used as an exception to other GATT provisions where
subnational measures are involved. Even if a party does not
have reasonable measures available to it to change the subna-
tional policy, a case of nonviolation, nullification and impair-
ment would exist.8 7 To remedy the situation, the party would
likely have to compensate other parties whose benefits were
"nullified or impaired"8 8 by the violation.
NAFTA goes further in requiring state compliance. The
scope provision of the agreement states that "[t]he Parties shall
ensure that all necessary measures are taken in order to give
effect to the provisions of this Agreement, including their obser-
vance, except as otherwise provided in this Agreement,8 9 by
state and provincial governments." 9
With respect to national treatment, NAFTA affirmatively
requires a state to accord treatment "no less favorable than the
most favorable treatment accorded by such province or state to
84. Draft Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multi-
lateral Trade Negotiations, GATT Doc. MTN.TNC/W/FA (Dec. 20, 1991) § U.4.,
art. XXIV:12:13 (available from the office of the United States Trade Represen-
tative). The draft was tabled by GAIT Director-General Arthur Dunkel on
December 20, 1991.
85. Id. § U.4, art. XXIV:12:14.
86. Id. The provisions referred to in this language are contained in GATT
Article XXIII.
87. See GATT, art. XXIII:1(b).
88. The GATT provision on nullification and impairment is Article XXIII.
The provision provides that if GATT determines that the benefits of one party
have been nullified or impaired by the actions of another party, GATT may
authorize the affected party to withdraw concessions from the offending party.
GATT, art. XXIII:2.
89. The most notable exception is government procurement, where volun-
tary state accession is contemplated. See infra text accompanying note 145.
90. NAFTA, art. 105.
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any like, directly competitive or substitutable goods, as the case
may be, of the Party of which it forms a part."91
NAFTA eliminates the ambiguities of the rule stated in
GATT Article XXIV:12 by requiring the parties to take "all nec-
essary measures," and by referring directly to provinces and
states in the national treatment section. Under these provi-
sions,92 there will be no room for dispute over the extent to
which states are obligated to comply.
C. SEEKING STATE COMPLIANCE
NAFTA's strong language on state national treatment obli-
gations demonstrates an awareness that state compliance is cru-
cial to the elimination of non-tariff barriers to trade. A trade
agreement requiring national treatment of goods can only suc-
ceed if the agreement is followed at both the national and subna-
tional levels.
The goal of national treatment is to prevent discrimination
against foreign products once they have crossed the border and
are being distributed and sold internally.93 In the United States,
products are distributed and sold within individual states. There
is no federal market. Thus, even if the federal government elim-
inated all discriminatory internal regulations and taxes, the
United States could never guarantee national treatment to for-
eign products if the states were free to maintain such measures.
Any reduction in trade barriers achieved through GATT could
always be undermined by discriminatory measures at the state
level.
The situation involved in the second beer dispute94 illus-
trates this point. Excise taxes that favor domestic producers of
alcoholic beverages exist at both the federal and state levels.95 If
only the federal government were to eliminate the discrimina-
tory tax policies, foreign producers would still face formidable
non-tariff barriers in the states. Absent affirmative steps to en-
sure state compliance, other nations will have little incentive to
reduce their trade barriers.
If NAFTA's provision on state national treatment is not
91. NAFTA, art. 301:2.
92. In the United States, it remains to be seen whether Congress will incor-
porate the strong language regarding state national treatment obligations into
the implementing legislation necessary to bring NAFTA into U.S. domestic law.
93. See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text.
94. See supra notes 62-68 and accompanying text.
95. See supra text accompanying notes 63-64.
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strictly followed once the agreement is adopted, NAFTA will
not fully open North American trade. Canada and Mexico will
have no reason to fully eliminate their barriers while impedi-
ments to trade are allowed to exist at the state level in the
United States.96
The shifting stances taken by the United States and Canada
in the beer dispute cases97 foster this type of unproductive at-
mosphere. The GATT panel noted in the second beer case that
the use of Article XXIV:12 as a limitation on state obligations
would effectively give "a special right to federal states without
giving an offsetting privilege to unitary states."98 By arguing
that Article XXIV:12 obligates Canada to ensure provincial com-
pliance, and later arguing that the same provision limits U.S. ob-
ligations with respect to the states, the United States effectively
seeks an advantage over both unitary countries and other fed-
eral countries. A similar characterization can of course be made
with regard to Canada's arguments in the two beer dispute
cases.
99
The inclusion of an explicit reference to states and prov-
inces in NAFTA's national treatment section shows better judg-
ment than the arguments made in the GATT beer cases. The
drafters obviously recognized that NAFTA cannot create a true
free trade area without obligating the parties to eliminate trade
barriers at all levels. Recognition of the same truth in GATT
affairs, and in GATT litigation, would be a major step in the
multilateral reduction of world trade barriers.
III. GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT
As the role of governments has expanded in recent decades,
so has the volume of government purchases. When negotiations
for a Government Procurement Code °00 began in the 1970s, it
was estimated that purchases by the government sector in some
countries accounted for over forty percent of the gross national
product.10 1 In the United States today, annual state and local
government purchases alone total approximately $200 billion.10 2
96. Similarly, the United States will have no incentive to fully eliminate its
trade barriers if the Canadian provinces continue to maintain discriminatory
measures.
97. See supra notes 52-54, 69-74 and accompanying text.
98. Panel Report on U.S. Alcohol Restrictions, supra note 62, 5.79.
99. See supra note 71.
100. See infra note 105 and accompanying text.
101. See Nat'l Treatment Obligations, supra note 23, at 221.
102. Governors Adopt Resolutions Supporting NAFTA, GATT Procurement,
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Thus, efforts to open world procurement markets are important
to the general goal of opening world trade.
Despite the economic magnitude of government procure-
ment, present international trade agreements cover government
purchases in a very limited fashion. No current agreement cov-
ers subnational procurement.
The national treatment obligations of GATT do not apply to
government procurement. Article III:8(a) makes this clear by
exempting "laws, regulations or requirements governing the
procurement by governmental agencies of products purchased
for governmental purposes" from GATT's national treatment
rules. 10 3 Because all government procurement is expressly ex-
empted from GATT, state procurement practices are not af-
fected in any way by the fact that GATT is federal law. 0 4
A. THE TOKYO ROUND GATT PROCUREMENT CODE
Vhile GATT itself does not cover government procurement,
a separate Agreement on Government Procurement, the Pro-
curement Code, was completed in 1979 as part of the Tokyo
Round negotiations. 0 5 The range of contracts actually covered
by the 1979 Code is limited. Only contracts valued at SDR
130,000 or more are covered. 1° 6 Service and construction con-
8 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1237 (Aug. 21, 1991) [hereinafter Governors Adopt
Resolutions]. According to figures released by the U.S. Department of Com-
merce, state and local government purchases totalled $207.6 billion in 1991, and
$205.4 billion in 1990. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, ECONOMICS AND STA-
TISTICS ADMINISTRATION, BUREAU OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, SURVEY OF CUR-
RENT BUSINESS Sept. 1992 at 11, tab. 3.7(b) (these figures do not include
employee compensation). Total federal, state and local government purchases
were $462.9 billion in 1991, and $451.5 billion in 1990. Id. (These figures do not
include employee compensation, but do include federal national defense
purchases).
103. GATT, art. III:8a. The exemption does not apply to goods purchased by
governments "with a view to commercial resale or with a view to use in the
production of goods for commercial resale." Id.
In Baldwin-Lima-Hamilton Corp. v. Superior Court, a contract proposal re-
quiring that electric generating equipment purchased by the city of San Fran-
cisco be manufactured in the United States, was held to conflict with GATT,
and thus invalid under the Supremacy Clause. Baldwin-Lima-Hamilton Corp.
v. Superior Court, 25 Cal Rptr. 798, 809 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1962). The court
stated that the Article III:8a exemption did not apply because the equipment
would be used to generate electric power for resale. Id (emphasis added).
104. See K.S.B. Technical Sales Corp. v. North Jersey Dist. Water Supply
Commission, 381 A.2d 774 (N.J. 1977).
105. GATT, Agreement on Government Procurement, BISD 26th Supp. 33
(1980) [hereinafter Procurement Code].
106. SDR refers to "Special Drawing Right," which is an international re-
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tracts are not covered at all. In addition, only those governmen-
tal entities specifically designated by each signatory nation are
subject to the 1979 Code's provisions. 0 7
The 1979 Procurement Code contains a national treatment
provision which requires that the procurement practices of cov-
ered governmental entities accord treatment to the goods of
other parties that is "no less favourable than that accorded to
domestic products and suppliers."'08 There are presently
twenty-three signatories to the 1979 Code.i°9
In contrast to the ambiguities of the GATT rule stated in
Article XXIV:12, n 0 it is clear that the 1979 GATT Procurement
Code does not cover state procurement. Article 1:2 of the 1979
Code requires only that the Parties "inform their entities not
covered by this Agreement and the regional and local govern-
ments and authorities within their territories of the objectives,
principles and rules of this Agreement.... and draw their atten-
tion to the overall benefits of liberalization of government
procurement.""'
The absence of state coverage is significant. As mentioned
serve asset created by the International Monetary Fund. See JACKsON & DA-
VEY, supra note 16, at 856. All Fund members are eligible to receive SDR
allocations and use them in transactions among themselves or with the Fund
itself. Id. The original threshold for coverage under the GATT Procurement
Code was SDR 150,000. Procurement Code, art. I, supra note 105, at 34. It was
lowered to SDR 130,000 in 1986 and took effect at various times after that date.
GATT, Decision of 21 November 1986 on Exchange Rate Questions Relevant to
the Threshold Requirement in Article 1:1(b) of the Agreement, BISD 33d Supp.
190 (1987).
Under Executive Order 12,260, the U.S. Trade Representative is required
from time to time to determine the dollar equivalent of 150,000 SDR (now
130,000 SDR). Exec. Order No. 12,260, 3 C.F.R. 311 (1980), reprinted in 19
U.S.C. § 2511 (1988). For 1992, the U.S. government valued SDR 130,000 at
$176,000. 56 Fed. Reg. 66,117-01 (1991). The practice of the U.S. Trade Repre-
sentative is to set the dollar equivalent every two years. Telephone interview
with Mark Linscott, Director, Government Procurement, Office of the United
States Trade Representative (Jan. 14, 1993). The 1992 rate will remain in effect
during 1993. Id.
107. For example, U.S. entities such as the Tennessee Valley Authority and
the Department of Energy are not covered. For the European Community,
publicly owned telecommunications entities are not covered. S. REP. No. 249,
96th Cong., 1st Sess. 128 (1979), reprinted in 1979 U.S.C.C.A.N. 514, 515, 529.
108. Procurement Code, art. II, supra note 105, at 35.
109. The signatories are: Austria, Canada, the European Economic Commu-
nity (each member country is bound by the Procurement Code), Finland, Hong
Kong, Israel, Japan, Norway, Singapore, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United
States. Committee on Government Procurement, BISD 38th Supp. 91 (1992).
110. See supra text accompanying note 37.
111. Procurement Code, art. 1:2, supra note 105, at 35.
1993]
MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE
above, the market for state and local government procurement
in the United States is estimated at $200 billion annually. 112 The
European Community contends that it is effectively shut out of
this market because of various state "Buy American"113 or "Buy
In-State" statutes. Presently, thirty-seven states have "Buy In-
State" provisions.114 Sixteen states, including fourteen of the
states that have "Buy In-State" requirements, maintain provi-
sions that either require or encourage the procurement of Amer-
ican made goods and services.115
B. THE VIEW OF U.S. COURTS ON THE STATES AND
GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT
One avenue available to parties affected by "Buy American"
laws or other discriminatory state practices is to challenge the
measures in the U.S. courts. Such challenges may be predicated
upon the preemption of inconsistent state law under the
Supremacy Clause, 116 or on the federal government's exclusive
power to regulate foreign commerce." 7
State regulations which interfere with Congress' authority
over foreign commerce may be held to be unconstitutional even
in the absence of specific conflicting federal legislation. 18 Two
state court opinions reached different conclusions on this issue
in evaluating state "Buy American" legislation. In Bethlehem
Steel Corp. v. Board of Commissioners, the California Court of
Appeal held that the California "Buy American" Act was "an
112. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
113. The federal government also maintains a "Buy America" Act. 41
U.S.C. § 10 (1988). The Trade Agreements Act of 1979 implemented the Pro-
curement Code by authorizing the President to waive the requirements of the
national "Buy America" Act for countries who were signatories to the Code. 19
U.S.C. § 2511 (1979).
114. James D. Southwick, Binding the States: A Survey of State Law Con-
formance with the Standards of the GATT Procurement Code, 13 U. PA. J. INT'L
Bus. L. 57, 76 (1992). "Buy In-State" provisions take one of the following three
forms: 1) a preference for in-state bidders or products when all other factors
are equal; 2) a preference for in-state bidders or products up to a specified per-
centage above the cost of outside products; 3) a preference for in-state bidders
over bidders from states which have in-state preference policies. Id.
115. Id. at 75-78. For example, Minnesota requires that "[t]o the extent pos-
sible, specifications must be written so as to permit the public agency to
purchase materials manufactured in the United States." MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 16B.101(2) (1992).
116. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. See also supra notes 14, 20-21 and accompany-
ing text.
117. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. See also supra notes 12-13 and accompany-
ing text.
118. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
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unconstitutional encroachment upon the federal government's
exclusive power over foreign affairs." 119 In K.S.B. Technical
Sales Corp. v. North Jersey District Water Supply Commission,
the New Jersey Supreme Court upheld a "Buy American"
law. 120 The court did not find the law to be unconstitutional,
and held that GATT did not preempt the law because of the ex-
clusion of government procurement. 121 These cases were de-
cided prior to the existence of the 1979 GATT Procurement
Code.
In Reeves, Inc. v. Stake,122 the Supreme Court held that
South Dakota's policy of restricting the sale of cement produced
at a state owned plant to South Dakota residents was not invalid
under the interstate commerce clause.123 The Court noted the
two conflicting state court opinions on "Buy American" laws, 24
and indicated in dicta that state laws which burden foreign com-
merce may be subject to heightened scrutiny.125 The Court,
however, did not decide the issue.
More recently, the Third Circuit Federal Court of Appeals
comprehensively addressed the relationship between state pro-
curement law and international trade agreements. In Trojan
Technologies, Inc. v. Pennsylvania,126 a Canadian manufacturer
(Trojan) challenged the validity of the Pennsylvania Steel Prod-
ucts Procurement Act, which required that suppliers use only
119. Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Board of Comm'rs, 80 Cal. Rptr. 800, 802 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1969).
120. K.S.B. Technical Sales Corp. v. North Jersey Dist. Water Supply
Comm'n, 381 A.2d 774 (N.J. 1977).
121. Id. at 789. The court noted that GATT had the same force as a U.S.
treaty obligation, and thus was superior to state law. Id. at 778. Because of the
exemption of government purchases, however, the "Buy American" law was
not inconsistent with GATT. Id. at 782. See also supra note 44.
122. Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429 (1980).
123. Id. at 446-47. The Court reasoned that because South Dakota was act-
ing as a "market participant" rather than a "market regulator," its actions were
not invalidated by the Commerce Clause. Id. at 440. For further discussion of
"market participant" doctrine, see infra note 131 and accompanying text.
124. Id. at 437 n.9.
125. Id. In a 1984 plurality opinion, the U.S. Supreme Court noted that "[i]t
is a well accepted rule that state restrictions burdening foreign commerce are
subjected to a more rigorous and searching scrutiny. It is crucial to the efficient
execution of the Nation's foreign policy that 'the Federal Government... speak
with one voice when regulating commercial relations with foreign govern-
ments.'" South-Central Timber Development, Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82,
100 (1984) (quoting Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276, 285 (1976)).
126. Trojan Technologies, Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 916 F.2d 903 (3d Cir. 1990),
cert. denied, - U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 2814 (1991).
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American made steel in products sold to public agencies. 127 Any
payments made in violation of the Act were recoverable directly
from the supplier.12s Trojan had supplied water-disinfection
systems that contained steel components to several Penn-
sylvania municipalities. Following a request by the Penn-
sylvania Attorney General for documentation showing that the
steel used in the systems was American made, Trojan sought de-
claratory and injunctive relief from the enforcement of the stat-
ute.129 The district court denied the requested relief and the
case was appealed.13°
In affirming the district court, the court of appeals found
that the Pennsylvania statute was not invalidated by the Com-
merce Clause because the state was acting as a "market partici-
pant," rather than a "market regulator.'' s3 The state's policy
did not amount to regulation of foreign commerce, in the court's
view, because the state was acting only as a purchaser of
goods.132
Additionally, the court held that present international
agreements on government procurement did not preempt the
Pennsylvania statute. The court pointed to the language in the
GATT Procurement Code which merely requires parties to en-
courage state compliance, 33 as well as to legislative history indi-
cating that Congress and the Executive understood that state
governments would not be covered.134 The court further noted
that U.S. trade policy in the government procurement area ap-
127. Id. at 904.
128. Id. at 905.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 910-11. The "market participant" doctrine has been articulated in
a series of Supreme Court cases. Essentially, when the state itself enters the
market as a purchaser or seller, nothing in the Commerce Clause forbids it
from restricting its own sales or purchases. See generally ROTUNDA, supra note
21, § 11.9.
In Reeves, the Supreme Court said in dicta that state policies burdening
foreign commerce may be subject to heightened scrutiny. Reeves, Inc. v. Stake,
447 U.S. 429, 437 n.9 (1980). Trojan indicates, however, that the "market partici-
pant" doctrine is applicable in both the foreign and interstate commerce con-
texts. Trojan Technologies, Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 916 F.2d 903, 910 (3d Cir.
1990).
132. 916 F.2d at 911. The court contrasted this situation with instances in
which a state acts as a market regulator. The court mentioned tax schemes as
an example of the latter. While acknowledging that the regulatory situation
would warrant greater scrutiny, the court did not say whether regulations af-
fecting foreign commerce would be invalidated. Id.
133. See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
134. 916 F.2d at 908. The court also found that the U.S.-Canada Free Trade
[Vol. 2:143
SEEKING STATE COMPLIANCE
peared to be based upon a reciprocal negotiating strategy,
whereby the United States intended to reduce its procurement
barriers only in return for equivalent action by other nations.' 35
Although it rejected the specific challenge to the Penn-
sylvania statute,l s 6 the court stated that "[i]f Congress and the
Executive conclude that a state statute . . . is antithetic to the
national interest, they have full authority to foreclose its contin-
uing operation.' 37 The court indicated that state "Buy Ameri-
can" laws could be invalidated by a "comprehensive scheme so
pervasive" as to indicate clear congressional intent to preempt
such legislation. 3 8
The holding in Trojan demonstrates that state procurement
practices are not affected by current international trade agree-
ments, and that the Commerce Clause does not restrict discrimi-
natory state procurement policies. The case, however, also
confirms that the federal government does have the power to
bind the states under a procurement agreement, and thereby
preempt state "Buy American" laws. It remains to be seen
whether Congress and the Executive will develop the political
will to enact "a comprehensive scheme" to bind the states.
C. PROPOSALS TO COVER SUBNATIONAL PROCUREMENT UNDER
THE GATT PROCUREMENT CODE AND NAFTA
State coverage has been a central focus of negotiations
aimed at broadening the scope of the 1979 GATT Procurement
Code.i39  Subnational procurement is also addressed in
Agreement did not evince an intent to preempt inconsistent state procurement
laws. Id.
135. Id. at 909. The reciprocal strategy is illustrated by the Trade Agree-
ments Act of 1979, which implemented the GATI' Procurement Code provisions
by giving the President authority to waive the national "Buy America Act" for
those countries signing on to the code. See 19 U.S.C. § 2511 (1979), amended by
19 U.S.C. § 2511(d) (1988).
The court in Trojan rejected a further challenge to the Pennsylvania stat-
ute based on the federal government's exclusive power over foreign affairs.
Trojan Technologies, Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 916 F.2d 903, 913-14 (3d Cir. 1990).
The court noted that, given the evident reciprocal trade strategy, striking down
the statute would amount to "judicial redirection of established foreign trade
policy." Id. at 914.
136. The court also rejected equal protection and vagueness challenges to
the Pennsylvania statute. 916 F.2d at 914-15.
137. Id. at 909.
138. Id.
139. Success of Procurement Talks Hinges on Inclusion of State, Local
Procurements, 8 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 17 (Jan. 2, 1991). The talks, which are
in conjunction with, though not technically part of, the Uruguay Round have
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NAFTA. 140 U.S. federal officials, however, have thus far been
unwilling to enter into an agreement that would commit the fed-
eral government to preempt state "Buy American" laws.
In September 1990, the European Community proposed that
the 1979 GATT Procurement Code be revised to include all sub-
central government procurement. In contrast, the United States
proposed allowing state and local governments, eighteen months
after the completion of an agreement, to decide voluntarily
whether to participate.141 On August 20, 1991, the National Gov-
ernors' Association passed a resolution in support of state inclu-
sion in the GATT Procurement Code.142 The resolution is not
legally binding,143 but could potentially provide political support
for preemptive federal action on state procurement.
NAFTA contains a chapter on government procurement'"
also focused on the inclusion of the European Community's publicly-owned
telecommunications operators. The United States has insisted on their inclu-
sion. The European Community has offered to include these operators only if
the United States includes its privately-owned operators in the Code. The
United States has rejected such a plan. See Europe and USA Reach Stalemate
on Government Procurement Talks, FINTECH TELECOM MARKETS, Mar. 5, 1992,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File.
Other proposals under consideration include the coverage of service con-
tracts and the establishment of a bid protest procedure. Southwick, supra note
114, at 61.
140. See ifra note 145 and accompanying text.
141. EC is 'Worried' About States and GATT Code, 55 Fed. Cont. Rep.
(BNA) 349 (Mar. 18, 1991), available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File. A
draft of a revised Procurement Code was produced on December 20, 1991. The
draft states that subcentral entities listed in Annex 2 are covered, but the annex
itself is left blank. There is no reference to whether state accession is to be
voluntary or compulsory. GATT, Draft Agreement on Government Procure-
ment, GATT Doc. GPR/64, art. I (Dec. 20, 1991).
142. Governors Adopt Resolutions, supra note 102, at 1237. Judy Thomas,
Staff Director for the National Governors' Association Committee on Interna-
tional Trade and Foreign Relations, cited the potential of a revised Procure-
ment Code to expand U.S. export markets, as well as lower costs that would
result from a wider range of competition for state purchases, as reasons for sup-
porting state accession to the GA'T Procurement Code. Id.
143. In order for a state to actually join the agreement, the state legislature
would have to approve it. The legislature would also have to implement
changes to the state's procurement practices, if existing practices are inconsis-
tent with the GATT Code. See Southwick, supra note 114, at 64.
144. NAFTA, ch. 10. The range of contracts covered in this chapter is
broader than that in the 1979 GATT Procurement Code. See supra text accom-
panying notes 106-07. Most notably, NAFTA covers service and construction
contracts. See NAFTA, Annexes 1002.4, 1002.5. However, various types of ser-
vice contracts are excluded from coverage. See id. Annex 1002.4. For all types
of contracts, only specified federal entities and enterprises are presently cov-
ered. Id. art. 1002:1.
Dollar thresholds for coverage under NAFTA vary according to the type of
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which adopts the voluntary approach to state coverage. A provi-
sion in the chapter states that "[t]he parties will endeavor to con-
sult with their state and provincial governments with a view to
obtaining commitments, on a voluntary and reciprocal basis, to
include within the obligations of this Chapter procurement by
state and provincial government entities and enterprises.' 145
There is an annex to the procurement chapter, presently left
blank, in which state and provincial entities, voluntarily submit-
ted for coverage under the chapter, will be listed.146
D. SEEKING STATE COVERAGE
Because there are separate federal and state procurement
markets, state coverage is not technically necessary to procure-
ment agreements. 147 Agreements such as the 1979 Procurement
Code which reduce procurement barriers only at the national
level can be valuable, particularly if they are expanded to cover
more federal entities and more types of contracts. In light of the
large annual volume of state and local procurement,14s however,
the coverage of state procurement under a new GATT Procure-
ment Code and NAFTA would contribute significantly to the
liberalization of world procurement markets.
As in other trade issues, there are domestic political obsta-
cles to affirmatively binding the states under a procurement
agreement. "Buy American" laws are politically difficult to
eliminate at any level because of their nationalistic tone. State
procurement is particularly sensitive because preemption of
state practices would be perceived as federal intrusion not only
in policy making, but also in how the states spend their own rev-
enues. Indeed, U.S. courts have recognized few constraints on a
state government's ability to discriminate among domestic or
foreign entities when it is acting as a purchaser or seller of
goods.
14 9
contract and the type of procuring body. For federal entities (generally agen-
cies) the minimum dollar values of covered contracts are $50,000 for goods,
$50,000 for services, and $6.5 million for construction services. Id. art. 1002:3(a).
For federal enterprises (generally companies with significant government own-
ership such as the Tennessee Valley Authority) the minimum dollar values of
covered contracts are $250,000 for goods, $250,000 for services, and $8.0 million
for construction services. Id. art. 1002:3(b).
145. NAFTA, art. 1024:3 (emphasis added).
146. See id. Annex 1002.2.
147. This is in contrast to agreements aimed at reducing non-tariff barriers
to goods, where state compliance is essential. See supra Part II.C.
148. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
149. See supra notes 122-23, 131-32 and accompanying text.
1993]
MNN. J GLOBAL TRADE
On the surface, the approach adopted in NAFTA whereby
states themselves will voluntarily accede to the government pro-
curement chapter' 5° might appear to be a way out of the state
coverage dilemma. As noted, a similar approach has been pro-
posed by the United States in the GATT Procurement Code
negotiations. 151
The voluntary approach is attractive because it shifts the
political decision making to the state level. Once the Governor
and state legislature agree that it is beneficial for the state to be
covered under the agreement, presumably they will have mus-
tered the political will to change any inconsistent legislation
such as a "Buy American" law. In contrast, a Congressman who
votes in favor of an agreement that affirmatively binds the states
would be in the awkward position of having to explain to legisla-
tors and constituents in his home state that purchasing policies
must be changed.
A close examination of the voluntary approach, however,
reveals serious flaws. Each state has little incentive to assent to
the agreement individually. Because no mechanism exists by
which the fifty states can collectively volunteer to sign the
agreement, 152 each state legislature will have to evaluate the
costs and benefits of such a move and act accordingly. The bene-
fits that accrue to a particular state individually, however, are
difficult to measure.
The reciprocal benefits of state coverage are likely to accrue
on a nationwide basis, rather than directly to a state that chooses
to participate. Thus, the incentives for an individual state to
voluntarily join the agreement are weak. For example, if Min-
nesota decided to commit to NAFTA's government procurement
requirements, it is unlikely that the Mexican government would
enter into increased procurement contracts with Minnesota
firms. Rather, the Mexican government would most likely open
a particular subcentral market in Mexico to all American firms.
An individual state might find it beneficial to open its pro-
curement market if the state determined that it could save
money by procuring goods from foreign firms. There is, how-
ever, nothing which prevents a state from eliminating "Buy
150. See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
151. See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
152. Although the National Governors' Association has passed a resolution
favoring such a step, the resolution is non-binding. Accession to NAFTA or the
GATT Code would have to be approved by each state legislature. See supra
note 143 and accompanying text.
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American" requirements now if it makes such a determination.
No further incentive is provided by the prospect of joining an
international agreement. Thus, it makes little sense for an indi-
vidual state to accede on its own to the NAFTA or GATT gov-
ernment procurement agreements.
Because the potential benefits of open procurement mar-
kets will accrue on a nationwide basis, and not directly to indi-
vidual states, the United States can realize reciprocal benefits in
the procurement area only if it acts as a unit. It is the federal
government's role to determine whether a trade agreement is in
the U.S. national interest and to act accordingly. If federal offi-
cials believe that opening state procurement markets will yield
substantial reciprocal benefits, they should seek political sup-
port for mandatory state coverage, rather than waiting for vol-
untary commitments.
Neither mandatory state coverage nor voluntary accession
can be effectuated without political support from the states. If
there is no firm state support for the idea of state coverage, the
voluntary accession plan is meaningless. If state governments
have the political will to voluntarily join the NAFTA or GATT
procurement agreements, surely they have the will to support
federal action on state procurement. Indeed, mandatory state
coverage may help state officials who favor the economic bene-
fits of open procurement, but wish to avoid direct political heat
for relaxing "Buy American" laws.
The 1991 National Governors' Association resolution'-1 indi-
cates that there is support for opening procurement markets at
the state level. This is not surprising, given the lower state ex-
penditures that would result from potentially increased compe-
tition for state contracts.'5 Federal officials should test this
support by proposing mandatory state coverage. Relying on vol-
untary state accession will ultimately do little to open procure-
ment markets.
CONCLUSION
Although it is well settled that the federal government has
the legal power to bind the states under international trade
agreements, political considerations often make Congress and
the Executive reluctant to use this power. Recent disputes over
state-level non-tariff trade barriers, as well as negotiations on
153. See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
154. A spokesperson for the Governors, in fact, cited lower state expendi-
tures as a reason for supporting state coverage. See supra note 142.
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government procurement, have reflected this dichotomy be-
tween what is legally possible, but politically difficult.
State compliance is crucial to trade agreements that require
the elimination of non-tariff barriers. NAFTA recognizes this
by explicitly requiring subnational compliance with its national
treatment requirements. The U.S. government should consist-
ently follow this policy in GATT, as well as in NAFTA.
While state coverage is not essential to agreements on gov-
ernment procurement, such coverage would be valuable given
the large volume of state and local procurement. Rather than
evading the issue by proposing voluntary state coverage, federal
officials should seek political support for definitive action on
state coverage. If Congress and the Executive determine that
opening state procurement markets will yield significant na-
tional benefits, they should commit to mandatory state coverage
under international procurement agreements.
